An Analysis of Stephen Law’s Objection to Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Yunus Prasetya


The most controversial premise of Alvin Plantinga’s EAAN is the first: the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable given naturalism and evolution is low. Stephen Law objects that this premise rests on the assumption that naturalists are committed to the view that beliefs cause behavior by virtue of their neurophysiological properties and independently of their content—a false assumption, according to Law. If the naturalist holds that belief content determines behavior, then the first premise of Plantinga’s argument is false because adaptive behavior suggests true beliefs. Here I defend Plantinga’s EAAN. I grant Law’s claim that the naturalist need not hold that beliefs cause behavior independently of content, but I argue that adaptive behavior does not suggest true beliefs since there are many false beliefs that cause adaptive behavior.



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