Why Plantinga Fails to Reconcile Divine Foreknowledge and Libertarian Free Will

Andrew Rogers

Abstract


In this paper I argue that Plantinga fails to reconcile libertarian free will with divine foreknowledge in his 1986 essay On Ockham’s Way Out. Plantinga focuses on responding to an argument that they cannot be reconciled made by Jonathan Edwards in his 1754 book Freedom of the Will. I argue that Plantinga’s objections to Edwards can be interpreted as either an appeal to backwards causation or as misreading Edwards’ metaphysical argument as an epistemic argument. Either way Plantinga’s objections to Edwards can be met by combining Edwards’ argument with Peter VanInwagen’s Consequence Argument. This combination makes it clearer why Plantinga’s response does not refute Edwards’ argument. I conclude that Edwards’ argument still stands and that Plantinga has failed to reconcile libertarian free will with divine foreknowledge.


Keywords


philosophy

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